IAA report into ATM failure at Dublin

The Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) today issued it's report into the failure of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system at Dublin which occurred on several occasions between June 2 and July 9 2008. The ATM system consists of primary and secondary radars, the data from which is processed by a central flight data processing (FDP) system which produces an air situation display on an air traffic controller's screen. The purpose is to allow the controller separate aircraft safely and maintain an efficient traffic flow. The screen shows the aircraft's identification, type, speed and altitude. The FDP system is linked to each controller's station by a local area network. A significant feature of the system is that each aircraft's flight plan data is coupled with the radar track on the controller's screen to provide aircraft ID. This process is known as coupling. The first system malfunction occurred on June 2 whereby aircraft entering the system did not have the aircraft type or identification displayed. On three further occasions up to July 9 similar failures occurred which eventually resulted in the decision being taken at 13.15 on July 9 to discontinue use of the system due to instability. Engineers from Thales ATM, the equipment supplier and Hewlett Packard had been on site attempting to replicate the problem on training equipment when this decision was made. It was between 13.15 and 15.10 that Thales and IAA engineering staff identified the root cause of the problem as being a faulty network card. Subsequently Thales identified that the root cause of all the system failures had been the dual failures of the network interface card and the network recovery system. Thales also issued a number of recommendations in relation to additional hardware and software improvements in the system which are currently in the process of being implemented in both Shannon and Dublin. The report also pointed out that aircraft safety was never compromised at any time during any of the failures and that the failure was not a 'radar failure' as described in certain elements of the media.